Appendix K
Total Choice Health
(Sourced Fiscal Tables)
The most current version of this reference material is maintained online at peopleprimaries.com. The online edition may include annotations, updated commentary, and supplemental analysis not reflected in this printed version.
Table 1: Baseline U.S. Healthcare Spending (2024)
This table is built around the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ own “type of sponsor” breakdown of the $5.3 trillion National Health Expenditure — the classification CMS uses to divide healthcare spending by who ultimately pays, which is the only version of this table that reconciles to the total by construction.
| Sponsor Category | Annual Spending (2024) | Share of NHE |
|---|---|---|
| Total National Health Expenditure (NHE) | $5.3 trillion (~18.0% of GDP) | 100% |
| Federal government | ~$1.65–$1.7 trillion | ~31% |
| State and local government | ~$860 billion | ~16% |
| Combined Public Spending (Federal + State/Local) | ~$2.5 trillion | ~47% |
| Households (out-of-pocket + share of employer premiums) | ~$1.5 trillion | ~28% |
| Private businesses (employer share of premiums) | ~$967 billion | ~18% |
Source: CMS, “National Health Expenditures 2024 Highlights.”
Illustrative federal-program detail (partial, not additive to the sponsor table above)
The rows below break out the largest named federal programs folded into the “Combined Public Spending” figure above. They are illustrative, not a second independent total — they do not sum to $2.5 trillion on their own, because Combined Public Spending also includes non-Medicare/Medicaid federal outlays and the roughly $860 billion in state and local government spending (state Medicaid share, public employee health benefits, state hospital and public-health spending) that the program-by-program list below does not itemize line by line. Figures below carry the vintage noted for each program; where 2024 figures were not yet finalized at time of writing, the most recent confirmed CMS/KFF figure is used and labeled.
| Program | Annual Spending | Population Covered |
|---|---|---|
| Medicare (net of premiums) | ~$1.0–$1.1 trillion (2024) | ~66.6–68 million enrollees (2024) |
| Medicaid / CHIP (federal + state combined) | ~$930 billion (2024) | ~84.3 million enrollees (2024) |
| VA Healthcare | $128 billion (2023 est.) | 9 million veterans |
| Federal Employee Benefits (FEHB) | $65 billion (2023 est.) | 8 million covered |
| ACA Marketplace Subsidies | $125 billion (2023 est.) | 24 million enrolled |
| TRICARE | $60 billion (2023 est.) | 9.6 million military families |
| Indian Health Service | $8 billion (2023 est.) | 2.6 million served |
| Other federal/state public programs | ~$50 billion (2023 est.) | — |
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), National Health Expenditure Accounts and “National Health Expenditures 2024 Highlights”; Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), “Medicare 101” and Medicaid enrollment trackers; Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Medicare enrollment reflects CMS NHE (66.6M) and KFF’s broader Medicare-101 count (68M); Medicaid/CHIP enrollment reflects the 2024 decline from 92.2M (2023) driven by post-pandemic eligibility redeterminations.
| Category | Annual Spending | Population Covered |
|---|---|---|
| Employer-Sponsored Insurance (employer + worker premiums) | $1.3–$1.5 trillion | ~165 million (60% of under-65 population) |
| Uninsured | — | ~27 million |
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) National Health Expenditure Accounts; Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF); Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
Table 2: The Three-Column Fiscal Framework
Every dollar in the Total Choice Health proposal is classified as exactly one of the following. No dollar appears in more than one column.
Column A — Real Savings (genuine resource reduction)
| Source of Savings | Estimated Annual Amount | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Administrative consolidation (standardized benefit product, simplified claims/billing, reduced prior-authorization overhead across Medicaid, VA-purchased care, TRICARE, ACA, and employer markets) | $75–$160 billion | Comparative administrative-cost share vs. peer countries with multi-payer competitive marketplaces (Switzerland, Netherlands). Note: traditional Medicare’s own administrative overhead is already low (~2% of program spending); consolidation savings in this line come primarily from the more fragmented VA, TRICARE, Medicaid, and employer-plan billing infrastructure, not from replacing Medicare’s administration. |
| Uncompensated care conversion (uninsured emergency-room cost shifted to insured primary/preventive care) | $20–$60 billion | American Hospital Association uncompensated care estimates (~$40B/year baseline) |
| Subtotal, core savings | $95–$220 billion | $75B + $20B at the low end; $160B + $60B at the high end. This core figure — not the conditional line below — is the number used consistently elsewhere in this chapter and appendix. |
| Conditional price effect (multi-insurer competition on standardized product; contingent on provider-market concentration policy) | $0–$100 billion, conditional | Not guaranteed without accompanying hospital-pricing/anti-consolidation measures; named but not counted toward the core total until earned |
| Total Real Savings | $95–$220 billion / year, core (up to $320 billion, conditional) | Uncompensated-care conversion is itself partly a transfer (cost already being shifted onto insured patients and providers) and only partly pure waste reduction; treated conservatively within the $20–$60B range above. |
Column B — Transfers (not savings; dollars already in the system, relocated)
| Transfer | Estimated Annual Amount | Nature of Transfer |
|---|---|---|
| Existing federal/state program spending → voucher system | $2.4–$2.5 trillion | Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, ACA subsidies, federal/state employee benefits, and routine VA-purchased care redirected, not eliminated; specialized VA hospital capacity held separate and excluded from this figure |
| Employer premiums → wages + dedicated worker contribution | $1.3–$1.5 trillion | Same compensation dollar, converted from opaque premium to visible wage/contribution |
| State Medicaid relief (federalization of voucher funding) | $280–$325 billion, phased | Real relief for state budgets; not a national saving, only a shift between levels of government. Full relief is a Phase 3 destination, reached via a 15-year state maintenance-of-effort (MOE) contribution that phases down from near 100% to zero on a straight-line schedule tied to each state’s cohort transition timeline — not funded up front against named ESI-recapture revenue that, net of the $190–$250 billion already committed to covering the uninsured (see Column D below), leaves only roughly $100–$260 billion available against the $280–$325 billion obligation (see Column C revenue table below) |
| Total Transfers | $4.0 trillion+ / year |
Column C — Revenue (genuine new Treasury receipts)
| Revenue Source | Estimated Annual Amount | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Recapture of Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI) tax exclusion, phasing in | $350–$450 billion | Joint Committee on Taxation: $299B (FY2022); CBO projection: $641B by 2032; largest single federal tax expenditure |
Note: The ESI tax exclusion’s full 10-year cost is estimated at $3.9 trillion (income tax only) or $5.9 trillion (combined income and payroll tax) by Treasury/OTA analyses. It is also widely documented as regressive — its value rises with the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, meaning it disproportionately benefits higher earners with more generous employer plans.
Column D — New Costs (owned explicitly, not hidden inside “savings”)
| New Cost | Estimated Annual Amount | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Extending vouchers to current ESI population (~165 million) | $1.2–$1.5 trillion gross | Overwhelmingly offset by Column B employer-premium transfer; not a net new draw on the Treasury |
| Extending vouchers to current Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, ACA marketplace, and routine VA populations (~160 million) | $2.4–$2.5 trillion gross | Fully offset by Column B government-spending transfer; a change in administration, not a net new draw on the Treasury |
| Covering the currently uninsured (~27 million) | $190–$250 billion | The only genuinely new, un-offset cost in the entire proposal; financed by Column C revenue |
Table 3: International Comparators
| Country | Model | Coverage | Spending (% GDP) | Since |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Switzerland | Mandatory private insurance, community rating, income-based subsidies, ~35 insurers nationally | 99.5% | ~12% | 1996 |
| Netherlands | 25+ private insurers, income-based subsidies, standardized basic benefit | ~99% | ~10.5% | 2006 |
| United States (current) | Fragmented public/private/employer system | ~91% (27M uninsured) | ~18% | — |
Source: OECD Health Statistics; Swiss Federal Office of Public Health; Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport.
Design Safeguards Required in Implementing Legislation
- Risk adjustment, not a flat voucher — benchmark premiums must be adjusted for age and health status to prevent adverse-selection competition among insurers.
- Statutory indexing rule — the voucher must be indexed to medical inflation (not general CPI) in the authorizing statute itself, to prevent the benefit from silently shrinking over time.
- Standardized benefit product — plans compete on price, network, and service, not on obscuring benefit design.
- Non-transferable card with capped carryover — prevents the voucher from becoming a disguised cash-out program.
- Cohort-based transition — phased implementation by population segment (uninsured and individual market first; then Medicaid, ACA, TRICARE, and routine VA care; then the employer-sponsored population and new Medicare-eligible retirees) to manage fiscal and administrative load, with no current Medicare enrollee ever forced to move.
- Human review requirement — no coverage or claims determination may rest solely on an automated system without meaningful human review and a real appeal right.
- Specialized VA hospital capacity carved out — polytrauma, PTSD, spinal-cord-injury, and other trauma-specific VA programs remain outside the voucher marketplace; only routine primary and preventive veteran care converts.
- Independent risk-adjustment fraud audits — because a voucher model shifts fraud risk from fee-for-service billing to risk-score upcoding, implementing legislation must fund randomized clinical-record audits of insurer risk-adjustment scores, mandate overpayment clawbacks with real penalties, and publish insurer-level upcoding rates.
Sources
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), National Health Expenditure Accounts, 2024; Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), Employer Health Benefits Survey and health spending trackers; Congressional Budget Office (CBO), federal subsidy and tax expenditure projections; Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis; American Hospital Association, uncompensated care cost estimates; OECD Health Statistics; Swiss Federal Office of Public Health; Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport.